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Campaign Finance, Communications
and the First Amendment
By BOB PACKWOOD*
Introduction
The First Amendment to the Constitution contains the most important single sentence in the history of human liberty: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the government for a redress of grievances."'
The right to engage freely in all forms of communication, particularly in political expression, lies at the core of all electoral process and
is the key to our First Amendment freedoms.2 The language of the
First Amendment is clear and emphatic. Yet, Congress and various
federal agencies have, from time to time, enacted laws or promulgated
regulations that have had profound consequences on freedom of expression, especially in the political context. As the courts have interpreted the language of these laws and regulations, much of the First
Amendment protections have been lost and the3government has gained
some power to regulate freedom of expression.
When public interests compete with fundamental civil liberties society is presented with difficult choices. Our Constitution, however, requires that the governmental power be limited: "In every case the
power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible
end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom."4 This is particularly
* Republican Senator from Oregon. Chair, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
& Transportation. B.A., 1954, Willamette University; LL.B., 1957, New York University
School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
3. As will be discussed more fully below, provisions of the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L.
No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162, and the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609),
(1934) (amended 1937), as well as regulations promulgated by the Federal Communications
Commission thereunder, have imposed content-related restrictions on the broadcast media.
Similar restrictions have been imposed on the print media.
4. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
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true with regard to First Amendment freedoms; nevertheless, the
proper boundaries of governmental action have been transgressed.

One example of the government's failure in this area stems from the
efforts of Congress to purge federal elections of corruptive influences

by enacting campaign finance reform legislation.5
Freeing federal elections from corruption and giving all individu-

als an equal opportunity to be elected to federal office are unquestionably valid goals, and the power of Congress to regulate federal elections

is well-established.6 Congress has usually attempted to accomplish
these goals not merely by direct regulation of elections, but also by
directly or indirectly regulating communications and restricting political expression.7 While the Supreme Court has determined that a

number of these limitations impermissibly infringe on fundamental
First Amendment rights,8 the Court has upheld many other provisions
5. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court considered constitutional
challenges to various provisions of federal law which, with one exception, had their origins
in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3,
amendedby the FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 18, and 26 U.S.C.). The sole exception involved the provisions for
public funding of candidates in presidential general elections, which had their origin in Title
VIII of the Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 562, amendedby Public Debt
Limit-Temporary Increase Act, Pub. L. No. 93-53, § 6, 87 Stat. 134 (1973). The specific
provisions of these statutes will be discussed in more detail below.
6. Art. I, § 4 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate the time, place,
and manner of elections to the House of Representatives and the Senate. See Smiley v.
Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). This power to regulate extends to primary elections. United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The Supreme Court has also recognized the broad
power of Congress to legislate in the areas of presidential elections. See Burroughs v.
United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
7. The Supreme Court noted that the effect of the contributions and expenditure limitations under the FECA was to "impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties in addition to any
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations otherwise imposed. A restriction on the
amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because
virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 18-19 (footnotes omitted).
8. The Supreme Court distinguished the effect of the FECA's expenditure limitations
from its contribution limits, stating that the "expenditure limitations. . . represent substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints on the quantity and diversity of political
speech." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 19. Thus, the Court struck down those provisions
relating to the $1,000 limitation on expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate,"
18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1970); the limitation on expenditures by candidates from
personal or family resources, 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1970); and the ceiling on overall campaign expenditures by candidates seeking nomination for election and election to
federal office, 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (Supp. IV 1970). These provisions, the Court stated, "place
substantial and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to
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that it found to entail only "marginal restriction[s]" upon the ability to
engage in free communication.9
With the full approval of the courts, the federal government has
regulated freedom of expression in other ways as well. The courts recognize that television, radio, and other mass media are "indispensable
instruments of political speech." 10 Indeed, they are indispensable instruments of nonpolitical speech as well. Yet, as will be discussed more
fully below, the law today does not extend the same First Amendment
protections as are accorded to print communications. In essence, the
government asserts the right to control the electronic media by licensing and by content.
Means of expression are not static. Today, we are in the midst of a
technological revolution in communications. Soon, people will be able
to receive their daily newspaper through wires running to their homes
or from broadcasts transmitted directly by satellite. While no one can
envision exactly what the predominant form of communication will be
in the distant, or even the near, future, surely it will be electronic rather
than print in the sense that we now use the term.
This Commentary will discuss whether the First Amendment, as
applied, is sufficient to fully protect freedom of expression, now and
into the future. Included in this discussion will be an examination of
some of the issues raised when government infringes on political speech
through campaign finance reform legislation and on broader forms of
expression through regulation in general. Further, a course of action
will be proposed to meet the challenge this nation faces in ensuring that
our most fundamental liberty-freedom of expression-is preserved.
I.

Federal Election Campaign Reform Legislation

Until 1972, the principal statute regulating the financing of political campaigns for federal elective offices was the Federal Corrupt
engage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate." 424 U.S. at 58-59.
9. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976). Finding that FECA's contributions
limitations, along with its disclosure provisions, constituted "the Act's primary weapons
against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of
candidates on large campaign contributions. . . [without] impinging upon the right of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and discussion," the Court upheld the following provisions of the Act: the $1,000 limitation on contributions to a single
candidate, 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1970); the $5,000 limitation on contributions by a
political committee to a single candidate, 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1970); and the
$25,000 limitation on total contributions by an individual during any calendar year, 18
U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1970). 424 U.S. at 58.
10. 424 U.S. at 19.
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Practices Act of 1925.11 The 1925 Act was unsatisfactory because it was
easy to circumvent and difficult to enforce. 12 These inadequacies led
Congress to enact comprehensive legislation regulating campaign financing, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). 13 The
principal thrust of this legislation was to limit the total amount that
could be expended on the use of communications media by or for candidates for federal offices. The maximum spending limit was the
greater of ten cents times the voting age population in the area to be
represented, or $50,000; of the amount so determined, not more than
sixty percent could be spent for broadcast media use. In addition, the
1971 Act required the reporting of much more detailed information
about the source of campaign contributions than did the 1925 Act. The
new law did not become effective until April 1, 1972, at which time the
campaigns for the 1972 elections were already well under way.
In the wake of political abuses stemming from the Watergate
break-in and the presidential campaign of 1972, Congress determined
that the 1971 Act did not go far enough and enacted the 1974 Amendments to the FECA. 14 There were several purposes for this legislation.
First, Congress wanted to protect the integrity of elections by eliminat-ing the actuality of or the appearance of corruption stemming from the
influence of large political donations. Second, Congress sought to
bring under control the skyrocketing costs of campaigning for federal
office. Lastly, Congress attempted to advance the goal of political
equality between wealthy and less wealthy candidates, and between incumbents and challengers, by imposing limits on contributions and
expenditures.15
The 1974 Amendments sought to accomplish these goals in several
ways. The legislation replaced existing limitations on media expenditures with limitations on total campaign expenditures and imposed new
limitations on the amounts and sources of contributions. 6 It provided
for public financing of presidential nominating conventions and match11. 43 Stat. 1070.
12. The Supreme Court noted that past disclosure laws were relatively easy to circumvent because candidates were required to report only contributions that they had received
themselves or that were received by others for them with their knowledge or consent; furthermore, the data that was reported was virtually impossible to use because there were no
uniform rules for compiling reports nor provisions requiring corrections and updates. 424
U.S. at 62 n.71 (citing Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46
N.Y.U. L. REv. 900, 905 (1971)).
13. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608, repealed 1976).
14. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codifed at 18 U.S.C. § 608, repealed 1976).
15. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25-26.
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1974).
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ing funds to pay for presidential primary campaigns." The 1924 Act
established a Federal Election Commission (FEC) to supervise the administration of campaign laws.18

Under the new contribution limits, individuals were prohibited
from giving more than $1,000 to a candidate for an election campaign
or more than $25,000 overall to individuals, groups and parties during
a single year.' 9 Political committees were limited to contributions to
candidates of no more than $5,000 per election.20 Under the restrictions on campaign expenditures, candidates were limited in the amount
of personal funds they would spend on their own campaigns; 2 1 a ceiling
was also imposed on the total amount that a candidate and the candidate's campaign organization could spend to advance his or her candi-

dacy. 22 Finally, the new law limited to $1,000 the independent
expenditures an individual or organization could make in support of a
"clearly identified candidate" for federal office.23
I.

Constitutional Challenges to the 1974 Amendments to the
FECA

The constitutionality of virtually every provision of the 1974
Amendments to the FECA was challenged in Buckley v. Valeo ,24 a suit
brought by then-Senators James L. Buckley and Eugene J. McCarthy,
17. See 26 U.S.C. § 6096 (1974) and I.R.C. §§ 9001-9042 (1974).
18. 2 U.S.C. § 437 (1974).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1)(3) (1974) (repealed 1976).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (1974) (repealed 1976).
21. The limit of a candidate's use of personal monies varied with the federal office he
sought. Presidential candidates could spend $50,000; candidates for Senate, $35,000; and
House candidates, $25,000. 18 U.S.C. § 608(a) (1974) (repealed 1976).
22. Presidential candidates could spend $10,000,000 in seeking nomination for office
and an additional $20,000,000 in the general election campaign. 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(A),
(B) (repealed 1976). The ceiling for Senate campaigns was dependent on the size of the
voting age population of the State. In Senate primary elections, the limit was the greater of
eight cents multiplied by the voting age population or $100,000; in the general election the
limit Was increased to 12 cents multiplied by the voting age population of $150,000. 18
U.S.C. § 608(c)(I)(C), (D) (1974) (repealed 1976). The 1974 Act imposed blanket $70,000
limitations on both primary campaigns and general election campaigns for the House of
Representatives, with the exception that the Senate limit was applied in states entitled to
only one representative. 18 U.S.C. § 608(c)(1)(C)-(E) (1974) (repealed 1976). These ceilings
were to be adjusted each year in relation to the rise in the consumer price index for the 12
preceding months. 18 U.S.C. § 608(d) (1) (1974) (repealed 1976).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (1974) (repealed 1976). An independent expenditure is one
that is made neither with the cooperation of nor in coordination with the candidate or his
campaign organization.
24. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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together with ten co-plaintiffs.25 Of primary importance for this Commentary are the contentions of the plaintiffs that the contribution and
expenditure limits violated the First Amendment by infringing the free
speech rights of candidates, individuals, and political groups.26
These First Amendment challenges were flatly rejected in the
Court of Appeals.2 7 The court found that Congress had "a clear and
compelling interest" '2 8 in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, and therefore concluded that the substantive provisions of the
1974 Act were constitutional. The Court of Appeals upheld the constitutional validity of the Act's contribution and expenditure provisions
after determining that those provisions should be viewed as regulating
conduct, not speech.2 9 In so holding, that court relied on UnitedStates
v. O'Brien,3" a case which involved the claim that First Amendment
protections prevented the prosecution of defendant for burning his
draft card because his act was "symbolic speech," and therefore protected by the First Amendment.3" The Supreme Court rejected this
argument and sustained the conviction because it found "a sufficiently
important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element"
32
that was "unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, treated the Buckley
case far differently than the Court of Appeals. The Court upheld the
1974 Act's limitations on contributions as appropriate legislative weapons against the reality or appearance of improper influence stemming
from large campaign contributions. However, the Court invalidated
the Act's ceilings on overall campaign expenditures, the limitations on
25. The other plaintiffs were: then-Representative William A. Steiger, Stewart R. Mott;
the Committee for a Constitutional Presidency-McCarthy '76; the Conservative Party of
the State of New York; the New York Civil Liberties Union; the American Conservative
Union; Human Events, Inc.; the Mississippi Republican Party; the Libertarian Party; and
the Conservative Victory Fund.
26. Appellants asserted that both expenditure and contribution limits restricted the use
of money for political purposes; since virtually all meaningful political communications in
the modem setting involve the expenditure of money, appellants argued that these restrictions violated the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 11. They also argued
that the contribution ceiling contravened the Fifth Amendment by discriminating against
candidates opposing incumbent officeholders and against minor party candidates. Id at 24.
In addition, appellants contended that the contribution limitations had to be invalidated
because bribery laws and narrowly drawn disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing with "proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements." Id at 27.
27. 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
28. Id at 841.
29. Id at 840.
30. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
31. Id at 376-77.
32. Id at 376.
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a candidate's expenditures from his personal funds, and the independent expenditure ceiling.
At the outset, the Court stated, "Discussion of public issues and
debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation
of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression
... . The Court went on to reject the view of the Court of Appeals
that O'Brien set forth the applicable standard:
The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such
conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some
involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or
to reduce 3the
exacting scrutiny required by the First
4
Amendment.
Having reasoned that campaign contributions and expenditures
were speech and not conduct, the Court upheld the contribution limits
in spite of its declaration that the First Amendment affords political
expression the broadest protection. In part, the Court accomplished
this by distinguishing between contributions and expenditures.
The Supreme Court rationalized that restrictions on expenditures
necessarily reduced "the quantity of expression by restricting the
number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size
of the audience reached."3S Its analysis was based on the realization
that "virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass
society requires the expenditure of money" 36 and that "the electorate's
increasing dependence on television, radio and other mass media for
news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech."'37 Thus,
the limitations in the 1974 Amendments on campaign expenditures, a
candidate's expenditure of personal funds, and independent expenditures represented "substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints
on the quantity and diversity of political speech,"'38 and as such, were
constitutional.
33. 424 U.S. at 14.
34. Id at 16. Cf.Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).

35. 424 U.S. at 19.
36. Id
37. Id.
38. Id

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

752

[Vol. 10:745

Since the Buckley decision, the Supreme Court has expanded the
constitutional protection afforded political expenditures. In First NationalBank of Boston v. Bellotti,3 9 the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporations from making expenditures
promoting a candidate or seeking to influence the public on issues not
directly related to the corporation's business interests. The Court reasoned that the statute was an unconstitutional restriction on the free
flow of political information."a In Common Cause v. Schmitt,4" the
Court held that a federal law limiting independent expenditures by a
political committee in a presidential campaign on behalf of a candidate
who had accepted public financing violated First Amendment protections of political expression.
In Buckley the Supreme Court categorized campaign contributions
as a form of political speech not worthy of the same protection guaranteed to expenditures under the First Amendment. It reasoned that a
contribution "serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for
the support."4 2 The Court concluded that a contribution limitation
"entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication," 43 and found these restrictions on expression to be constitutionally permissible.
The distinction drawn by the Court between campaign expenditures and contributions, and the different First Amendment protections
that each form of regulation receives, has been subjected to considerable criticism.' Justice Blackmun stated that he was not persuaded that
"the Court makes, or indeed is able to make, a principled constitutional
distinction between the contributions limitations. . . and the expenditure limitations" 45 involved in Buckley. Chief Justice Burger agreed.
In his separate opinion, he stated "[t]he contribution limitations infringe on First Amendment liberties and suffer from the same infirmi46
ties that the Court correctly sees in the expenditure ceilings."
According to the Chief Justice,
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Id at 792.
455 U.S. 129 (1982).
424 U.S. at 21.
Id at 20.

44. See, e.g., Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the FirstAmendment an

Obstacle to PoliticalEquality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982).
45. 424 U.S. at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. 424 U.S. at 235 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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[Contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First
.. The Court's attempt to distinguish the
Amendment coin..
communication inherent in political contributions from the
speech aspects of political expenditures simply "will not wash."
We do little but engage in word games unless we recognize that
people-candidates and contributors-spend money on political
activity because they wish to communicate ideas, and their institutional interest in doing so is precisely the same whether they or
someone else utters the words.47
If there is truly to be a free marketplace of ideas as intended by the
First Amendment,4 8 then there must be a free marketplace of
communications.
III.

Government Regulation of the Electronic Media

As the court noted in Buckley, political campaigns now make extensive use of the electronic media.4 9 Yesterday's tree stumps and
soapboxes have given way to today's electronic boxes as candidates
have turned to radio, television, and cable to bring their names and
views to the attention of the voting public. Because the electronic media are so intertwined with the political process, our national communications policies are often manipulated in attempts to achieve political
reforms. In addition to direct regulation of candidates, Congress regulates the broadcasters and cablecasters that carry campaign advertisements and cover campaign activities. The Communications Act of
1934,50 the primary repository of communications law and policy, has
always contained special provisions governing the relationship between
broadcasters and political candidates. The recent reform efforts, especially the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197 1, have further extended and refined the regulation of political communications. The list
of regulations now governing what is loosely called "political broadcasting" demonstrates how the Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have used communications policy in an effort
to advance political reforms.
Congress has attempted to control the cost of political campaigns
by limiting the rates that broadcasters may charge politicians for their
advertisements. The "lowest unit charge" rule insures that during the
forty-five day period preceding a primary election and the sixty day
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id at 244 (emphasis in original).
See 435 U.S. at 810 (White, J., dissenting).
See 424 U.S. at 19.
47 U.S.C. § 151-69 (1934) (amended 1937).
See sufpra note 13 and accompanying text.
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period preceding a general election, a station may not charge a legally
qualified candidate more than a station's most favored commercial advertiser.52 At all other times, a station may not charge a legally qualified candidate more
than the rate charged to other advertisers for
'53
"comparable use."

Congress has enacted several provisions designed to insure that
candidates get "on the air." Broadcasters can have their licenses revoked "for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to
permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy." 54 A second access obligation is the
"equal opportunities" rule, which provides that once a candidate obtains time on a station, all other candidates for the same office must be
afforded equal opportunities to use that station.55 The FCC also requires "quasi-equal opportunities": if a station affords time during an
election to supporters of or spokespersons for a candidate in order to
discuss campaign issues or criticize opponents, then the station must
afford comparable time to representatives of those opponents.56
The FCC has limited the ability of broadcasters to freely editorialize during campaigns. The "political editorial" rule provides that if a
station broadcasts an editorial endorsing or opposing a candidate for
office, then candidates for the same office who are not endorsed or who
are opposed must be sent: a) notification of the dates and times of the
editorial; b) a script or tape of the editorial; and c) an offer of an opportunity to respond over the station. 57 The "personal attack" rule is similar. If a station attacks the honesty, character, integrity, or like
personal qualities of an identified person or group during discussion of
a controversial public issue, then the person or group attacked must be
sent: a) notification of the date, time and program on which the attack
was made; b) a script, tape, or summary of the attack; and c) an offer of
a reasonable opportunity to answer the attack over the station.58
A final aspect of regulation of the electronic media is the Fairness
Doctrine, which sets forth the general obligations of broadcasters.5 9
52. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)91) (1934) (amended 1937).
53. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(2) (1934) (amended 1937).
54. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1934) (amended 1937).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1934) (amended 1937).
56. This is also known as the "Zapple Doctrine." See Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d
707 (1970); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1982).
57. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1982).
58. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1979).
59. Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974). See also 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1934)
(amended 1937).
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Radio and television stations must devote a substantial amount of time
to the discussion of important, controversial public issues; a station that
presents one side of an issue must provide a reasonable opportunity for
the presentation of contrasting views on that issue.
IV.

The Practical and First Amendment Problems Created by
Government Regulation of the Media

It is an open question whether the political broadcasting rules
have accomplished the results intended by political reformers. These
rules, however, have created a number of problems that should persuade Congress to reject future attempts to manipulate communications laws to achieve political reforms.
First, the government has opened the gates to a flood of sensitive
political disputes. The political broadcasting rules are loaded with ambiguities, terms of art, exceptions, and qualifications, all of which call
for frequent intervention by the FCC and the courts. Every election
brings forth clashes between candidates and broadcasters over their
competing rights and interests.
Once these inevitable disputes arise, they are not always decided
by apolitical, disinterested parties. The FCC, which has formulated
many of the political broadcasting requirements and which sits in judgment on violations of these requirements, is itself politically oriented.
The commissioners are nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate according to their party affiliations. 60 Furthermore, the
Commissioners are constantly subjected to a variety of political pressures once they take office. 6
As a result, some observers have recognized at least the appearance of bias in the FCC's political campaign decisions. Justice Stevens
referred to this problem in his dissenting opinion in CBS v. FCC.6 2 In
CBS, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's finding that the three national television networks had violated the access requirements of the
Communications Act by refusing the Carter-Mondale Presidential
Committee's request for airtime. Justice Stevens noted:
The possibility that Commission decisions under § 312(a)(7)
may appear to be biased is well illustrated by this litigation. In
its initial decision and its decision on the networks' petitions for
reconsideration, the Commission voted 4-3 in favor of the Carter60. 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1934).
61. See E. KRASNOW, L. LONGLEY & H. TERRY, THE
LATION, ch. 3 (3d ed. 1982).
62. 453 U.S. 367, 419 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGU-
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Mondale Presidential Committee. . . . In both instances, the
four Democratic Commissioners concluded that the networks
had violated the statute by denying the Committee's request for
access; the three Republican Commissioners disagreed.6
The mere possibility that some of the FCC's decisions may be politically biased should cause the Congress to reject further political "reforms" which involve manipulation of communications policy.
A more fundamental problem is that these political broadcasting
rules give the federal government enormous power over the content of
information disseminated by the electronic media. The government
can directly and indirectly tell broadcasters what information they may
distribute. The government certainly has no such power over the content of the print media-the First Amendment prevents that. Why, despite the First Amendment, can the government regulate the electronic
media?
The government's power over the electronic media can be traced
back to the conditions accompanying the development of commercial
AM radio broadcasting in the 1920's. Radio was largely unregulated in
its infancy; as more and more stations came on the air, interference
among stations increased. The federal government stepped in to bring
order out of the resulting chaos by regulating the use of the spectrum of
frequencies: Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927," and later revised that effort with the Communications Act of 1934. Thus, the
blueprint of our national communications policy was laid out in a time
when spectrum scarcity was a primary concern and when radio was
more of a novelty than an established and vital source of information.
The conventional wisdom of that day held that "the radio spectrum
simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody. There is a fixed
natural limitation upon the number of stations that can operate without
interfering with one another."65 Therefore, to select those who were to
be granted licenses and thereby permitted to use the spectrum, the FCC
employed the measuring stick of the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity." 66
It was the notion of radio spectrum scarcity combined with the
public interest obligations that were imposed upon those who received
licenses which led to the political broadcasting regulations and other
content controls that exist today. These regulations have expanded
with the growth of communications methods and now cover television,
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id at 419.
44 Stat. 1162.
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1934).
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cable, and the soon-to-arrive direct broadcast satellite services. Although broadcasters have challenged content regulations on First
Amendment grounds, these controls have been upheld by the courts.
The most famous of the cases involving the constitutionality of
content regulations governing the broadcast media is Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,67 the landmark Supreme Court decision upholding
the constitutionality of the FCC's personal attack rule.68 Reasoning
that different First Amendment standards would apply to the electronic
media because they possess characteristics different from the print media, the Court held that the Fairness Doctrine 69 did not violate broadcasters' First Amendment rights.7" The primary difference cited was
the scarcity of the radio spectrum:
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees
given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies
for the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern. To condition the
granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present representative community views on controversial issues is consistent
with the ends and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgement of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. Congress need not stand idly by and permit those with
licenses to ignore the problems which beset the people or to exclude from the airwaysanything but their own views of fundamental questions.7 '
Five years after Red Lion, the Supreme Court was again faced
with a First Amendment challenge to a personal attack law. In Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,72 however, the law was directed at
newspapers rather than broadcasters, and was struck down. The language of the Court's unanimous opinion stands in sharp contrast to Red
Lion:
The Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First
Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors.
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for
news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the
size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and
public officials-whether fair or unfair--constitute the exercise of
67.
68.
text.
69.
70.
71.
72.

395 U.S. 367 (1969).
For a description of the personal attack rule, see supra note 58 and accompanying
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
395 U.S. at 367, 386-401.
Id at 394.
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated
how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press
73
as they have evolved to this time.
Our nation's media now operate under distinctly different sets of
First Amendment rules--one for print, and another for electronic media. Although both forms of media perform identical roles in our society-they inform, they entertain, they act as watchdogs over
government institutions-the content of only the electronic media can
be regulated. The time has come for a reassessment of this regulatory
model, if for no other reason than because advances in communications technology no longer permit old assumptions and old rationales
to go unchallenged. We live in an era of rapid and explosive communications development. Scarcity may have been a reasonable concern
during the 1920's and 1930's, but today's problem is keeping track of
communications abundance.
Radio broadcasting, of course, has grown far beyond the confines
of its infancy, and newer methods of communication seem to be appearing at an ever increasing rate. More than 9,000 radio stations and
over 1,100 television stations are presently licensed to broadcast in the
United States.7 4 Systems using coaxial cable can provide hundreds of
additional channels; future systems utilizing optical fibers could provide even more. Low-power broadcasting, microwave channels and direct satellite-to-home broadcasting will further expand
communications options. Communications technology is advancing at
such a rapid rate that even experts cannot predict what the future will
bring. They stress, however, that scarcity is no longer an issue. Any
limitations on communications abundance will be caused by economic
constraints or by government regulations, rather than by technological
shortcomings." Spectrum scarcity simply cannot be used to justify
government controls that fly in the face of First Amendment ideals.
In addition to undermining the validity of scarcity-based regulation of the electronic media, technological advances may prove dangerous for the heretofore unregulated print media. Technology is blurring
the once clear line between what is printed and what is electronic. So
long as the printed press has been just that, the First Amendment has
afforded virtually unlimited protection. Newspapers, however, are increasingly turning to electronic methods of gathering, transmitting, and
73. Id at 258.
74. See Broadcasting,Dec. 20, 1982, at 72.
75. See Hearings on Freedom of Expression Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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distributing information. As the press moves into the electronic realm,
can it remain safe from government regulation?
Those who feel that this is a fanciful concern should look more
closely at the MiamiHerald case. While the Supreme Court decision is
a ringing affirmation of newspaper freedom, this decision overturned a
very intriguing holding by the Florida Supreme Court.7 6 The Florida
court unanimously upheld the state's right of reply statute, and
anchored its decision in part on principles borrowed from broadcasting
law:
Newspapers are not wholly dependent on electronic media as
were the broadcasters in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC....
However, we have no difficulty in taking judicial notice that the
publishers of newspapers in this contemporary era would perish
without this vital source of communications. The dissemination
of news other than purely local is transmitted over telegraph
wires or over air waves. This not only includes dissemination of
news but also in chain newspaper operations so prevalent today,
the Miami Herald being one; even editorials are prepared in one
place and transmitted electronically to another. Therefore, the
principles of law enunciated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC... have been taken into consideration in reaching our
opinion.
Newspapers, of course, breathed easier when the Florida decision
was overturned, but they should not become complacent. The Florida
Supreme Court used this reasoning a decade ago when the Miami Herald was much less dependent upon electronic communications than are
newspapers today. And tomorrow, Congress, the courts, and the FCC
may be faced with even more persuasive arguments in favor of applying broadcast-type content controls to newspapers.
Teletext and videotext are two new services that have the potential
to be the "newspapers" of the future. These services will transmit textual information over wires or by broadcast signals into homes and offices where the information can be read off a video screen. When an
editorial can arrive as easily on a videoscreen as on a doorstep, how
will the government react? Will newspapers that use videotext delivery
fall under government content controls? Or will newspaper protections
be extended to all media?
76. Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 287 So. 2d 78 (1973).
77. Id at 86-87.
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Conclusion
We should not wait until new technologies force "either-or"
choices upon Congress, the courts, or the FCC. Freedom of expression
is a fundamental liberty that should not be left subject to further uncertainty. We must act now to insure that our government has no power
to regulate the content of any media, print or electronic.
The most lasting and complete way to guarantee freedom of expression for all media is to amend the Constitution. When the author
proposed that method, however, he found that there was not enough
support to proceed. Some of the strongest opponents of a constitutional amendment were members of the print media. They were sym-

pathetic to the underlying philosophy of a constitutional approach, but
feared the amendment process would be used to restrict, rather than
expand, press freedoms in the present climate of anti-press sentiment.
Thus, the most practical solution appears to be legislation that
would eliminate the federal statutory underpinnings of content regulation of the electronic media. The author has introduced a bill that
amends the Communications Act in order to accomplish that goal.7 8
78. S.1917, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983). The text of the act is as follows:
Sec. 1. "Be it enactedby the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the 'Freedom of Expression
Act of 1983.'
FINDINGS
Sec. 2. The Congress finds that(1) free and unregulated communications media are essential to our democratic society;
(2) there no longer is a scarcity of outlets for electronic communications;
(3) the electronic media should be accorded the same treatment as the printed press;
(4) regulation of the content of information transmitted by the electronic media infringes upon the First Amendment rights of those media;
(5) regulation of the content of information transmitted by the electronic media chills
the editorial discretion of those media and causes self-censorship, thereby dampening the
vigor and limiting the variety of public debate; and
(6) eliminating regulation of the content of information transmitted by the electronic
media will provide the most effective protection for the right of the public to receive suitable
access to a variety of ideas and experiences.
PURPOSES
Sec. 3. The purpose of this Act is to extend to the electronic media the full protection of
the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and free press.
AMENDMENTS TO THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
Sec. 4. The Communications Act of 1934 is amended(1) in section 312(a) by(A) adding 'or' immediately at the end of paragraph (5);
(B) striking out the semicolon and 'or' in paragraph (6)
and inserting in lieu thereof a period; and
(C) striking out paragraph (7);
(2) by repealing section 315;
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This legislation should attract the broad support necessary to become law. It may take several years to achieve passage in both houses
of the Congress, but the fight is worthwhile. Freedom of expression is
our most precious right, and we must make certain that it is fully protected in our modem society.

(3) by amending section 326 to read as follows:
'Sec. 326. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to give the Commission the
power to(1) censor any communication;
(2) review the content of any completed communication; or
(3) promulgate any regulation or fix any condition which shall interfere
with the right of free speech, including any requirement of an opportunity to
be afforded for the presentation of any view on an issue.'

